The war in mind

I am increasingly interested in the radicalising views expressed in Russian mainstream media on the relationship between Russia and the “West”. According to some publically acceptable points of view are those who see Russia with its few remaining allies already engulfed in an existential struggle against facism and an imperialism of cultural decay.

There is this strange believe that the West is in essence about sexual minority rights and public nudity. To an extend the Western democracies are, indeed, about limiting the states power to educate society on morality and enforce restrictive laws on issues like sexual orientation or public dresscodes. Limiting the vertical power of the state and of powerful local as well as regional alternatives to the state (renegade commanders, warlords, “oligarchs” setting up their own zones of territorial control, and, of course, of late “zelennyt chelovechki”) should be one of the more attracktive aspects of the soft power of Western democraties.

On the hard end of state power there have also been some limits. Thus far NATO has not attacked and occupied countries to take them over. Neither Serbia, Kosovo or Afghanistan have been annexed. Same holds for Iraq (though this was no NATO war). In the eastern European neighbourhood Russia appears to be more of a push factor for countries and societies to “bang on the doors of NATO” as Eduard Shevardnadze once put it. If Russia really was an attractive alternative it would not constantly have to resort to brute power and blackmail in order to assert its interests; and Western institutions like NATO or the EU would have a much harder time to extend their influence in a region dominated by Russia for a considerable amount of time. Governing by positive incentives – being attractive not only to totally corrupt elites but to the wider public – is cheaper than sending the army and twisting arms.
True, the US and British led a war of aggression against Iraq, true, NATO broke international law in Kosovo (for reasons I personally find justified – the dimension of the manmade humanitarian catastrophe affected Europe directly and left few decent options; what was politically stupid was the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state later on), true, Saakashvili messed up and Russia took the opportunity to draw a red line it had hitherto been unable to enforce with political or diplomatic means. But the mistakes of others and political weakness and unattractiveness of Russia are poor arguments to justify the current reckless and high risk course of action that country has taken.
And repeating the Kremlin songline, as some on the far left and far right in Europe do, that Russian (irregular) forces are there in neighbouring countries to protect Russians (i.e. ethnic Russians, passport Russians, Russian speakers, little Russian, zemlyaki) from fascists that “the West” is backing is plain silly. It is also a cynical caricature of the very sizable parts of society in Ukraine and other post-soviet countries who do not envision their future locked into post-modern authoritarianism just because they are geographically exposed to a Russian empire in agony.

Collection of recent articles :

  • Für die, die dieses Selbstexperiment nicht durchführen können oder wollen. Fernsehen bis der Arzt kommt. Spannend, dass die Beschützer des Friedens der Menschen in letzter Zeit fast immer maskiert und ohne Hoheitsabzeichen ihrer Arbeit nachgehen.

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/ein-tag-im-russischen-staatsfernsehen-12944596-p2.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2

  • Da kuda tolko devalis’ vse eti fashisti? Interesno, kak Rossiskii (i neskolko nemetskii) SMI i politiki etot resultat obyasnayut.

http://zyalt.livejournal.com/1084270.html

Wo sind nur all die Faschisten geblieben, die laut russischen Medien den Teil des Landes, der nicht von Russland annektiert bzw. von russischen Freischärlern beschützt wird, fest im Griff haben?

http://tvrain.ru/articles/makeeva_popadet_li_ukraina_v_evropu_s_prezidentom_poroshenko_chast_1-369018/

  • From the inventor of Russias “managed democracy” (Surkin) a new brilliant piece on non-linear warfare:

http://www.ruspioner.ru/honest/m/single/4131

Discussion of this in English: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/…/how_putin_is_reinventing…

  • The power of discourse. Thank god power is not only official discourse (public transcript). Institutions, infrastructure and an adaptive and educated society also matter. Very interesting question for social science/research is whether a new social contract is, indeed, emerging.

http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/05/counterrevolution-dont-look-now-russias-regime-gaining-strength/84556/?oref=d-skybox

One major risk is, however, that after the Crimean blueprint this potential “Russian Spring” will break Russia appart – and that is absolutely nothing to look forward to: “At that point, the ruling elite will conclude that Putin is not only no longer an asset, but has become a major liability. At the same time, Russian opposition parties and groups will be emboldened by the West’s stance and expect support. This is when we may see a ‘Russian Spring.’”

  • Es lohnt sich in dieser Sache einmal regelmäßig die ersten 5 Kommentare zu Ukraine-Artikeln deutscher Leitmedien (z.B. SZ, Zeit, Spiegel) zur lesen. Wenn man das ernst nähme bekäme man leicht den Eindruck, dass in Deutschland Journalisten, Redakteure und Politiker gegen eine breite und radikale pro-Kreml und anti-EU und USA Meinungsmasse anstinken würden. Die BBC veröffentlicht seit Jahren nur Kommentare zu bestimmten Themen und diese werden auf Einhaltung der Netiquette überprüft und dann erst freigegeben. Das ist zu politisch aufgeladenen Themen ein sinnvolles Vorgehen. Ich lese ja Zeitungen, weil sie von ausgebildeten Profis geschrieben werden, die sich für das, was sie schreiben, auch verantworten müssen. Zeitungen müssen nicht jedem Leser ein Forum bieten. In den Printmedien wird ja auch nicht jeder Leserbrief veröffentlicht. Austoben kann sich die breite Öffentlichkeit ja auf Facebook oder in eigenen Blogs.

http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/ukraine-konflikt-putins-geheime-online-armee.1781.de.html?dram%3Aarticle_id=287018

  • “No reputable organization would observe the electoral farce by which 97 percent of Crimeans supposedly voted to be annexed. But a ragtag delegation of right-wing populists, neo-Nazis, and members of the German party Die Linke (the Left Party) were happy to come and endorse the results. The Germans who traveled to Crimea included four members of Die Linke and one member of Neue Rechte (New Right). This is a telling combination.”

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117692/fascism-returns-ukraine

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